Job Matching under Constraints

Speaker: Prof. Ning Sun (Nanjing Audit University)

Topic:	Job Matching under Constraints
Time&Date:	2:30-3:15 pm, 2019/5/17 (Friday)
Venue:	Room 619, Teaching A
Speaker:	Prof. Ning Sun (Nanjing Audit University)
Abstract:	In a Kelso-Crawford job matching framework, we consider arbitrary constraints imposed on the sets of doctors that hospitals are allowed to hire. A constraint preserves the substitutes condition if and only if it is a ``generalized interval constraint,'' which is a slight generalization of an ``interval constraint'' that specifies the minimum and maximum numbers of doctors to be hired. If all hospitals' demand correspondences satisfy the substitutes condition, then the set of competitive equilibria is nonempty under a mild auxiliary assumption, the equilibrium salaries form a lattice, and a rural hospital theorem holds. We obtain a general comparative statics result and apply it to the case of varying interval constraints. We also show that instead of compelling hospitals to obey interval constraints, the government can entice them through appropriate subsidy and taxation.