Selling Mechanism with Passive Reassignment
Speaker: Dr. Xin Feng (Nanjing University)
|
Topic: |
Selling Mechanism with Passive Reassignment |
|
|
Time&Date: |
12:00-13:00 pm, 2019/10/24 (Thursday) |
|
|
Venue: |
Room 619, Teaching A Building |
|
|
Speaker: |
Dr. Xin Feng (Nanjing University) |
|
|
Abstract: |
A seller produces and sells products to consumers of mass one through a selling mechanism. Consumers are endowed with bi-dimensional private information on their own values and entry costs. Each consumer demands up to one unit of the product. We study both efficient and revenue-maximizing selling mechanisms with passive reassignment, which allows the possibility of allocating the products to non-participating consumers. |
More
