Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains

Speaker: Huaxia Zeng, Sun Yet-sen University


Topic:	Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains
Time & Date:	10:30am-12:00pm, 2017/11/3
Venue:	Room 502, Daoyuan Building, CUHK(SZ)
Speaker:	Huaxia Zeng, Sun Yet-sen University
Detail:	We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected+ domains, and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected+ domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof. Such a flexible function is distinct from generalized random dictatorships in that it allows for a systematic notion of compromise. Our characterization remains valid (under an additional hypothesis) for a problem of voting with constraints (Barbera et al., 1997) where not all alternatives are feasible.