Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information

Topic:

Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information

Date:

16/01/2017

Time:

10:30-12:00am

Venue:

Room 502, Daoyuan Building, CUHK (SZ)

Speaker:

Wei He

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Detail/

Abstract:

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e. almost perfect information), and (2) the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in perfect-information dynamic games with uncertainty. Our results go beyond previous works on continuous dynamic games in the sense that public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. As an illustrative application, an example on the dynamic stochastic oligopoly market is considered.